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THE COPYRIGHT LAW-A REAPPRAISAL
Herman Finkelstein t
"Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are
imperfect in definition, confused and inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many articles which, under
modern reproductive processes, are entitled to protection; they
impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor which are
not essential to the fair protection of the public; they are difficult for the courts to interpret and impossible for the Copyright Office to administer with satisfaction to the public.
Attempts to improve them by amendment have been frequent,
no less than twelve acts for the purpose having been passed
since the Revised Statutes. To perfect them by further
amendment seems impracticable. A complete revision of
them is essential."
Message of President Theodore Roosevelt
to Congress, December 1905.1
NEED FOR REVISION

A half century after President Theodore Roosevelt delivered the
message quoted above, it is still timely and descriptive of the legal
problems besetting the protection of authors' rights in America. To
t Member, New York and Connecticut bars; General Attorney, American Society

of Composers, Authors and Publishers; Chairman, Committee on Program for

Copyright Law Revision, Amer. Bar Ass'n; Chairman, Copyright Committee, New

York City Bar Ass'n; member of U. S. delegation, Intergovernmental Conference
on Universal Copyright Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, 1952.
1. 40 CONG. REc. 102 (1905).
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understand why the law seems to have stood still, we must observe
the pace of progress in science, literature and the arts during the past
half century. Just as the copyright laws of 1870 failed to meet the
needs of society at the dawn of the twentieth century, so the laws
framed in 1909 are obsolete as applied to our mid-century economy
and world outlook.
When President Roosevelt told Congress in 1905 that the copyright laws framed in 1870 "impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor which are not essential to the fair protection of the public,"
he was referring to laws enacted at a time when the physical rather
than the cultural growth of the nation was paramount-an era of
which a famous European observer said, "It was not the golden age
of Jefferson. Gone was the time of good taste, of culture, and of the
beautiful mansions of Virginia.

.

. . The first millionaire to be worth

one hundred million dollars, Commodore Vanderbilt, 'had read a
single book, Pilgrim's Progress, and that only after having reached
the age of seventy.' " 2

In the thirty-five year period which had elapsed since the Revised Statutes of 1870, America had grown from a rural to an industrial nation-just as we have been emerging during the latter part
of the past half century from industrial greatness to cultural preeminence. Although in 1905, only two or three percent of the people
lived near bookshops," there had already been planted the seeds of
the greatest revolution in the methods of communicating thoughts,
sentiments and emotions from the writer to his public since the days
of Gutenberg. Its impact was first felt in music, where the phonograph and automatic piano were to usher in an age of mechanization,
permitting the enjoyment of music without being near the performer,
affecting the habits of our citizenry to an extent not yet fully appreciated even in our day.4
At the dawn of the twentieth century, whole new vistas lay open
for the rapid world-wide circulation of ideas, intelligence and even
the movement of people themselves. The first airplane flight of more
than a half hour had just been made before President Roosevelt's message. This presaged an era of quick and easy transportation between
the continents-an advance that was to be paralleled by even more
startling developments in the means of communicating intelligence. We
had freely pirated works of foreign authors until the enactment in
2. MAUROis, THE MIRACLE OF AMERICA 310 (1944).
3. 2 SpiLLER, THORP, JOHNSON & CANBY, LITERARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 960 (1948).
4. In 1902, there were over 70,000 pianolas in use and over one million perforated
music rolls produced in the United States. White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co.,

209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908).
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1891 of a law requiring payment for the use of such works," theretofore
royalty-free in competition with works of native origin. This law
greatly benefited American authors by freeing them from the unfair
competitive advantage enjoyed by the publishers of imported works.
As ancient methods of industry and communications were pushed
aside, more time was released for leisure and education. Aware of
the necessity of encouraging authorship as a profession, the Register
of Copyrights, Thorvald Solberg, complained in 1905 that authors
seeking to earn a livelihood from their writings were still hamstrung
by ".

.

. a highly technical copyright system .

.

. under which

valuable literary and artistic property rights have come to depend
upon exact compliance with statutory formalities which have in
reality nothing to do with the equitable rights involved, and the defense of such property against infringement may be rendered nugatory
by reason of failure to fully comply with purely arbitrary requirements." ' In spite of the protests of President Theodore Roosevelt
and his distinguished Register of Copyrights, there still remain at
every turn unnecessary technicalities by which literary pirates reap a
harvest from the forfeitures imposed upon authors by our antiquated
copyright laws.
Among the famous literary works in which an author lost all
rights because of a technicality was The Autocrat of the Breakfast
Table. Dr. Holmes had authorized the publication of this work in
twelve installments of the Atlantic Monthly during 1857 and 1858.
Neither Holmes nor the publisher, however, complied with section
four of the copyright law then in effect, which provided that ".

. . no

person shall be entitled to the benefit of this act, unless he shall, before
publication, deposit a printed copy of the title of such book . . . in
the clerk's office of the district court. . . ." ' Holmes failed to

deposit the title until after publication of the Atlantic Mbnthly series,
shortly before the publication of the work in book form in November,
1858. After Dr. Holmes' death in 1894, unauthorized editions of
5. Act of March 3, 1891, c. 565, 26 STAT. 1107. Says Sullivan: "The nineties
was definitely a time of budding for American interest in American writers and
American types in fiction. This bad, to some extent, an economic basis. Before the
International Copyright Act of 1891, American publishers could watch what English
books were successful, and then print them in America without the expensive royalty
arrangements involved in the case of American authors. A New York publisher
testified . . . that 'the effect of absence of international copyright on the opportunities of American authors to get into print is most disastrous. . .

.'

A Boston

publisher testified: 'For two years I have refused to entertain the idea of publishing
an American manuscript' After the passage of the new law, in 1891, the effect 'in
encouraging the production of American rather than of foreign books has been little
less than marvelous'." 1 SULLIVAN, OuR TIMES 201 (1926). Even a greater development occurred in American drama. Id. at 219.

6. Sox.Ba, Co1YRIGHT IN CoxGRFass-1789-1904, at 7 (1905).
7. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 STAT. 437. (Emphasis added.)
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the work began to appear, whereupon suit was brought by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., the author's son and executor, then Chief
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Notwithstanding
the erudition of both the plaintiff and his testator, all the courts in
which the matter was litigated held that Dr. Holmes had forfeited
all rights in his work by failure to deposit the printed title at the
prescribed time, namely, before first publication.8
Justice Brown recognized the hardship of the decision, but suggested that "these are evils which can be easily remedied by an
amendment of the law." 9
After this experience, Dr. Holmes' executor assigned to the publishing firm of Houghton, Mifflin & Co. the rights of the estate in
another work which was then being reproduced without authorization,
The Professor at the Breakfast Table. In a suit brought by the publisher against the R. H. White Co., the facts were rather more favorable to the plaintiff than in the earlier case. Here, the first ten parts
were published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1859 without any endeavor
to comply with copyright formalities, but the remaining two parts
were published in the December 1859 issue of the Atlantic Monthly
after the publisher had secured copyright for that issue in the publisher's name. After the completion of this serial publication, Dr.
Holmes published the entire work in one volume, fully complying
with the requirements of the copyright law as to deposit and notice
in the author's name. There was no question but that the first ten
parts were in the public domain under the Supreme Court's earlier
decision. But the last two parts also appeared in defendant's publication. This time, the Court found that Dr. Holmes had failed to
clear another hurdle-in fact two of them: first, registration of a
work under the title Atlantic Monthly could not protect a work entitled
The Professor at the Breakfast Table; and secondly, if Holmes was
the copyright proprietor, the last two parts fell into the public domain
when they were published in the Atlantic Monthly with a copyright
notice indicating the magazine publisher, Ticknor & Fields, was the
copyright proprietor. Said Mr. Justice Brown most apologetically:
"While owing to the great reputation of the work and the
fame of its author, we might infer in this particular case that no
publisher was actually led to believe that the book copyrighted by
Dr. Holmes was not the same work which had appeared in the
Atlantic Monthly, that would be an unsafe criterion to apply to a
8. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899), affirming 80 Fed. 514 (2d Cir. 1897)
and 76 Fed. 757 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1896); Holmes v. Donohue, 77 Fed. 179 (N.D. Ill.

1896).
9. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 90 (1899).
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work of less celebrity. .

.

. With the utmost desire to give a

construction to the statute most liberal to the author, we find it
impossible to say that the entry of a book under one title by the
publishers can validate the entry of another book of a different
title by another person.". 1
At the same term of court, The Minister's Wooing, written by
Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe, met the same fate. Mr. Justice Brown
commented: "It is exceedingly unfortunate that, with the pains
taken by the authors of these works to protect themselves against republication, they should have failed in accomplishing their object; but
the right being purely statutory, we see no escape from the conclusion
that, unless the substance as well as the form of the statute be disregarded, the right has been lost in both of these cases." I"
Such cases continue to plague authors in spite of the enactment
of a general revision of our copyright laws on the last day of President
Theodore Roosevelt's administration-a statute which, with certain
amendments, today forms title 17 of the United States Code. Thus
the evils about which Mr. Solberg complained in 1904 are still with
us a half century later. The need for a general overhauling was pointed
out by Dr. L. Quincy Mumford, Librarian of Congress, and Arthur
Fisher, Register of Copyrights, in urging the Legislative Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate to appropriate funds for a threeyear study relating to the revision of the copyright law.'
There is abundant evidence that in our laws protecting intellectual property, we have not heeded the admonition of the late Mr. Justice Jackson that ".
law," that the ". .

each generation has a task of rewriting
.'substance as well as form of our law suffers
.

from obsolescence," and that those engaged in reshaping the law are
generally "too occupied with the thrust to estimate with.any accuracy
its velocity, direction or probable recoil." '8
The shortcomings of our laws in this field are not accidental;
their roots are to be found deep in history.
COPYRIGHT ASPECTS DESERVING RECONSIDERATION

We have seen literary property forfeited because of failure to
comply with formalistic requirements which no longer make sense in
modem society. Today we are the only nation in the world--except
10. Mifflin v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260, 264 (1903).
11. Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265, 266 (1903).
12. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 7117, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1955).
13. Jackson, Foreword to

JuRisPRuDENcE iN

AcrioN iii, v (1953).
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for the Philippines, which patterned its law after our own-where
authors are exposed to forfeiture of all rights in their works if they
fail to affix a copyright notice in the prescribed form, or at the specific
place mentioned in a most intricate statutory formula. 4 For example,
we still provide for forfeiture at the expiration of twenty-eight years
if the author fails to apply for renewal of his rights for an additional
term, or if the application is filed in the wrong name 15-a requirement abandoned in 1911 in Great Britain, where it first originated in
1709.
Another defect of our law is its refusal to permit each owner of
a separate right to be the legal owner of that right. For example, if
the author grants only serial rights to a magazine publisher, that publisher may not bring an action in his own name against an infringer
of those rights. In other countries, such a publisher would be the
copyright owner of the serial rights; a book publisher might own the
book publishing copyright; another the translation right; another the
recording right; but in the United States, there can be only one copyright owner, although he may hold certain rights in trust for others.'
If, perchance, a mere licensee-one who has acquired only one
set of rights, e.g., serial publication rightsshould publish the work
with his name as the copyright owner, the work becomes forfeit, as we
have seen in the cases involving The Professor at the Breakfast Table
and The Minister's Wooing."
14. 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 12-14, 16, 19-22, 24, 32 (1952). For cases in which
forfeitures resulted from failure to comply with formalities, see note 89 infra.
On the international scene the movement has been to do away with formalities. For
example, the Berne Convention, Sept. 9, 1886, art. II, made works subject to the
formalities of the country of origin; however, the Berlin Revision of the Berne
Convention, Nov. 13, 1908, art. 4, did away with formalities; and the Buenos Aires
Convention, Aug. 11, 1910, art. 3, abolished formalities but required a statement that
indicated reservation of the property right The Universal Copyright Convention,
Sept 6, 1952, art. III, states that all formalities shall be considered satisfied if the
work is first published bearing ". . . the symbol 0 accompanied by the name of the
copyright proprietor and the year of first publication placed in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of claim of copyright."
15. Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
650 (1938).
16. See In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F.2d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 1931);
Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924); T. B. Harms & Francis, Day & Hunter
v. Stern, 229 Fed. 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1915) ; Cohan v. Richmond, 19 F. Supp. 771, 773
(S.D.N.Y. 1937).
17. Mifflin v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903) and Mifflin v. Dutton, 190
U.S. 265 (1903). See Egner v. E. C. Schirmer Music Co., 139 F.2d 398 (1st Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 730 (1944) (declaring The Caisson Song in the public
domain because it had appeared in a compilation copyrighted in the name of one
who owned only the publishing rights and therefore was a mere licensee and not
the copyright proprietor, relying upon the earlier cases involving the Holmes works) :
Public Ledger Co. v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 294 Fed. 430 (8th Cir. 1923)
(throwing into the public domain James W. Gerard's My Four Years In Germany
because it had been published serially with a copyright notice in the name of one who
owned only the "serial and book rights"); Public Ledger Co. v. New York Times
Co., 275 Fed. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 279 Fed. 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 258
U.S. 627 (1922) (suit for copyright infringement of Lord Grey's letter commenting
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Another glaring defect relates to works which have been recorded
on records, tapes or other devices but which have not been reduced
to manuscript form. In such a case there has not been a copy of
the work upon which a notice of copyright may be affixed. The
record manufacturer need not imprint a copyright notice, 8 and the
performer obviously cannot. Yet under these circumstances, the
author may lose not only his recording and performing rights but also
his sheet music publication, motion picture and all other rights. 9
In other countries, the ownership of one right cannot be affected
by the acts or omissions of the owner of another right. They are
separate and distinct.F
It is appropriate to examine whether, in this respect, our laws
have kept pace with the velocity and direction of modem society. If
they are out of step, the process of reshaping should not be further
delayed.
In addition to questions of formalities and forfeitures, of indivisibility and ancient concepts of equitable-as distinguished from
legal-ownership, we must also examine the subject of duration, i.e.,
term of copyright.
The United States is the only major country which today computes the period of copyright protection from the date of publication
of the work. That was not always so. Other countries, beginning
with the very first copyright law of Great Britain, followed that course
but have since changed to a term equal to the life of the author plus
a certain number of years after his death. It is interesting to observe that the shortest period of copyright in any major country is
that of the Soviet Union, where it is the life of the author and fifteen
years after his death.21 Before the communist revolution the period
had been life and fifty years.'
on the United States Senate's attitude toward the League of Nations, published and
copyrighted in Great Britain by the London Times and published and copyrighted in
the United States by plaintiff, could not be maintained because plaintiff's contractual
relationship with the London Times was found to be that of a licensee having limited
rights, i.e., first North American publication rights to special news items which
appeared in the London Times, and not that of a proprietor entitled to a valid copyright under the Act of 1909).
18. Buck v. Lester, 24 F.2d 877 (E.D.S.C. 1928); Buck v. Heretis, 24 F.2d 876
(E.D.S.C. 1928). :
19. Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y.
1954); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill.
1950). But see Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mircury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d
Cir. 1955). See also Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of
Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. Rxv. 469 (1955).
20. For a discussion of divisibility, see Henn, "Magazine Rights"--A Division
of Indivisible Copyright, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 411 (1955).
21. Decree of Oct. 11, 1926, replaced by Ordinance of May 16, 1928, promulgating
"Principles of Copyright," and Decree of Oct 8, 1928. See 2 LADAs, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECrION OF LrrERARY AND ARTIsTic PROPERTY 1112-14 (1938).
22. Act of March 20, 1911, summarized in COPINGER, LAw OF COPYRIG T 460-67
(5th ed., Easton 1915).
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It is true that in cases where the author lives more than forty-one
years after publication of a particular work, the Soviet term of life
and fifteen years is longer than our two twenty-eight year terms, but
it is always shorter than the copyright term of any other country
which computes the duration of copyright protection from the death
of the author.
In any revision of the law of copyright, it will be necessary to determine whether the United States should now depart from its practice
of computing the term of copyright from the date of publication;
whether it should abandon the idea of having an initial term and a renewal term conditioned upon making an application therefor; whether
copyright should commence upon the creation of a "writing" which
for all practical purposes might terminate the common law protection
afforded by the several states; and if the term is to be measured by
the life of the author, whether the United States should adopt a period of life plus fifty years which prevails in most of the western
democracies, or whether it should adopt some other term.
If the term be measured from date of publication, then it is logical
to expect some formality, such as a notice of copyright or registration,
to fix the date indelibly. On the other hand, if the term is to be fixed in
relation to the date of the author's death, the date of publication becomes unimportant, and therefore a forfeiture need not be decreed as a
result of failure to affix the notice in the right place with the proper
year and the name of the copyright proprietor. It is also simpler to
permit divisibility if all rights in all works of an author terminate at
the same time, i.e., at a given period after his death.
As long as renewal rights are conferred only upon certain prescribed successors of the author-widows, children, executors, and
next of kin-without a clear definition of the order of succession,
there is bound to be much confusion and frequent litigation concerning the ownership of copyrights for the renewal period.,m
23. In the most recent contest, DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), involving the widow of a noted author and a son of the author born out of wedlock, it
was held that the widow and child were co-owners of the renewal rights. In reaching
its decision, the Court stated that "the widow and children of the author succeeded to
the right of renewal as a class, and are each entitled to share in the renewal term
of the copyright." Id. at 580. Query, whether this decision means that if there
were a widow and six children, the widow would only be a one-seventh participant
instead of being entitled to one-half. In other words, should the widow be treated
as a person whose rights are equal to those of all the children as a class, or each
child have the same share as the widow? It is submitted that this question is still
open. Incidentally, in amicus briefs of several associations-the Motion Picture
Association of America, the Music Publishers' Protective Association, and ASCAPit was unsuccessfully contended that the widow alone should own renewal rights in
those works which came up for renewal during her lifetime (after the author's death),
and that the children should own exclusively the renewals in works which came up
for renewal after the widow's death. Id. at 578. For other problems related to the
right of renewal, see Fred Fisher Music Co. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643
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There are other problems to consider. Should the composers
of symphonic works be entitled to payment only when their works
are performed publicly for profit, while authors of dramatic works are
entitled to compensation for all public performances whether or not
they are given for profit?. Is there any logical reason for permitting
public performances of musical works by means of coin-operated
machines without payment to the composer, while requiring such payment in the case of performances by means of machines in which a coin
is not deposited?
In arranging for permission to perform musical compositions publicly for profit, collective action is necessary. Should this be regulated
by our federal copyright laws, or should it be treated under state or
federal laws regulating combinations? To what extent should the several states be permitted to require duplication of the filing of copyright
data which may be readily obtained by inspecting the records of the
Federal Copyright Office?
All these matters require re-examination in the light of the presentday economy in which works of authors form the very core of large
industries, and provide entertainment and enlightenment to a populace
among whom education is practically universal. We no longer speak
of a "leisure class" at a time when all enjoy the leisure that was once
the privilege of only a few. In this new world, authorship assumes
an importance never before equaled. As the form of property created
by this group of our citizenry enters the channels of commerce in everexpanding form, the laws must be adjusted to meet the needs of our
day. It is with this in mind that we shall approach our subject.
HISToRIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT

System of "Privileges"--Encouiragement of Printing
Copyright, as a form of property, is a creature of modern times.
There is no authentic trace of it before the days of Queen Anne. True,
more than two centuries earlier the Venetian Republic in 1498 had
granted to one Democrito Terracina a monopoly to print all books in
Arabic, Moorish, Syrian, Armenian, Indian and Barbary for a period
of twenty-five years, and to another Venetian citizen a monopoly for
all printing of figured song for twenty years.2 4 These grants or priv(1943); Fox Films Corp. v. Knowles, 261 U.S. 326 (1923); Silverman v. Sunrise

Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909 (2d Cir. 1921); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Borst
Music Publishing Co., 110 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Yardley v. Houghton

Mifflin Co., 25 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314
(S.D.N.Y. 1937).
24. BRowN, THE VENETIAN PNINGnN PREss 41-42 (1891).
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ileges, however, were intended to encourage printing rather than
authorship.
Within the next two decades (1517), the Venetian Senate recalled every privilege theretofore granted and provided that in the
future no privilege was to be granted except for new works or works
never before printed, and that the approval of two-thirds of the Senate
should be required in each case.'
Similar privileges were being granted elsewhere. In 1518, the
Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian gave John Schoeffer the exclusive
right to print Livy for a period of ten years after publication, and a
like privilege for six years in the case of other books first published by
Schoeffer in Germany, even though they had been previously published
2

elsewhere.

The earliest grant of that nature in Great Britain which this writer
has been able to find was in the year 1519, when Henry VIII granted
to John Rastell for a period of seven years the exclusive right to print
and sell in Great Britain Rastell's English translation from the French
of an Abridgement of Statutes." Translations from French to English
were of great importance at that time. In 1530, a seven year privilege was granted to Jehan Palsgrave Angloys to publish a book of
French instruction which he had written. The patent recites:
[W]e greatly moued and stered by dewe consyderation
of his sayd long tyme and great dyligence about this good and
very necessary purpose employed, and also of his sayd great costes
and charges bestowed about the imprintyng of the same, haue
liberally and benignely graunted unto the sayd Maister Palsgraue,
our faurorable letters of priuilege, concernynge his sayd bouk,
called, Lesclarcissement de la langue francoyse, for the space and
terme of seuyn yeres next and immedyatly after the date hereof
enswyng." 28
Here we find the law developing in a crucible. Patents and copyrights had not yet emerged as separate branches of the law. The
25. Id. at 74, 207.
26. GROLIER CLUB,
(1895)

27.

EARLY PRINTED

Booxs

OWNED BY THE GROLIER CLUB

24-26

(facsimile #8).

DIGESTS, DIcoNiAIES AND INat 4-5 (1932). Another author tells us
that Pynson's edition of Pace's Oratio, published in 1518, was the "first book in
England to have a printer's cum privilegio." No mention is made of the number
of years for which the privilege was given. GREmNHOOD & GENTRY, CHRONOLOGY OF
Booxs & PRINTING 49 (1936).
28. As quoted in LOWNDES, AN HISTORICAL S=ErCH OF THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
6 (2d ed. 1842). A list of later patents and privileges may be found in ScRuTTox,
LAW OF COPYRIGHT 293-300 (lst ed. 1883).
COWLEY,

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Or ABRIDGmENTS,

DEXES OF ENGLISH LAW TO THE YEAR 1800,
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periods of patents, which were usually multiples of seven, were related
to the time required to train an apprentice. A fourteen-year period
was "just long enough to induct two sets of apprentices in the novel
mystery." 29
These patents-for such they were-were not copyrights as we
know them. A copyright does not depend on any royal favor or specific
grant. It is a right which all may enjoy who comply with the requirements of a general statute. There is no advance examination to determine copyrightability. The early Anglo-Saxon statutes applied only
to published works; the works were to be registered in a specified place,
accompanied by the deposit of a prescribed number of copies.8°
The French Revolution-Term of Copyright Related to Life of
Author
Prior to the revolution, the only forms of protection in France
were by resort to the old privileges of the type in effect in Great Britain
before the Statute of Anne. As early as 1542 a precursor of our copyright notice is found in a decree forbidding the offering for sale of any
book not bearing a certificate showing that it had been examined
and approved by the clerks or deputies of the faculty of the university
having charge of the subject to which the book was devoted. 81 Privileges had been granted earlier, as in the case of a five-year monopoly
granted by Francis I to the King's printer, Conrad NMobar, for all
books in Greek first published by him, whether these were the productions of modern scholars or were taken from old manuscripts. 2 Such
general privileges were being granted as late as 1703, as evidenced by
29. HAwnTON, PATENTS AND Fpxx ENTERPRiSE 16 (TNEC Monograph No. 31,
1941), quoting as authority Coke, Institutes pt. 3, c. 85: "'. . . the reason wherefore such a privilege is good in law is, because the inventor bringeth to and for the
commonwealth a new manufacture by his invention, cost and charge6, and therefore
it is reason that he should have a privilege for his reward (and the encouragement
of others in the like) for a convenient time; but it was thought that the times limited
by this act were too long for the private, before the commonwealth should be partaker thereof, and such as served such privileged persons by the space of 7 years in
making or working of the new manufacture (which is the time limited by law of
apprenticehood) must be apprentices or servants still during the residue of the
privilege, by means whereof such numbers of men would not apply themselves thereunto, as should be requisite for the commonwealth, after the privilege ended.'"
I.A.mTo, op. cit. supra at 16 n.13. The Statute of Monopolies, 1623, provided
that all patents to be granted in the future were limited to fourteen years; those al-

ready in existence were not to last longer than twenty-one years. 21 JAc. 1, c. 3,
§§5, 6.
30. The Statute of Anne required registration of title to the copyright at Stationer's Hall ". . . in such manner as hath been usual . . .," and the deposit of
nine copies of the book for the use of the Royal Library, the Universities of Oxford

and Cambridge, the four universities in Scotland, Sion College in London, and the

library of the Faculty of Advocates at Edinburgh. 8 ANNE C. 19, §§ 2, 5 (1710).
31. 2 PUTNAm, BooKs AND THEm MAxEas DURNG THE MIDDLE AGES 443 (1897).
32. Id. at 448-49.
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the ten-year privilege extended to the Bishop of Chartres covering all
breviaries, antiphonals, processionals, episcopal letters, psalters, hours,
catechisms, pastoral instructions, etc., which were required under the
general usage of the diocese.s All such special privileges were abolished, however, during the French revolution, with the consequence
that there were then no laws in France protecting literary works.
At the very height of the revolution, a law was enacted granting
to authors of dramatic works exclusive rights for the period of their
lives plus five years8 4 This was a radical departure from the British
precedent of calculating the period from the date of publication-an
initial term of fourteen years from date of publication having been in
effect since 1710, with a renewal term of fourteen additional years to
the author, if living. 5 The British term was obviously based on the
privileges or patents granted by the sovereign to publishers of certain
works. The new French approach was unfettered by historical considerations. This new democracy considered copyright as a boon to
authorship rather than an encouragement to printers, and related the
period of copyright to the life of the author.
The Concept of Copyright as a Form of Property
As we have observed, the laws safeguarding rights in literary
property were, at an early date, confused with concepts relating to
industrial property-a handicap that has not yet been overcome."6
Another early handicap was the fear of the sovereign that the existing
order might be challenged through the spread of dangerous thoughts
made possible by expansion of the art of printing. This gave rise to
a requirement that all works be registered, which in practice often
meant examined, before publication-a golden opportunity for coopera7
tion between the Star Chamber and the Stationer's. Company.
In addition, this new form of property had to meet the challenge
of legal theorists who had long asserted that nothing could be regarded
as the subject of property unless it was capable of being physically
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 463.
Act of Jan. 13-19, 1791, translation in WEIL, COPYRIGHT LAW 783 (1917).
8 ANNE c. 19, § 11 (1710).
Finkelstein, PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN MusIc AND PERFORMANCE RIGHT
SOCIETIES 1-3 (rev. ed. 1956), reprinted from 7 COPYRIGHT PROBLMS ANALYzED 6970 (1952); see Finkelstein, Anti-trust Laws and the Arts, in CONFERENCE ON THE
ARTS, PUBLISHING, AND THE LAW 66 (University of Chicago Law School Conference Series No. 10, 1952).
37. The Stationers' Company was organized in 1556; remnants of this particular
type of censorship remained, despite the demise of the Star Chamber in 1641, until the
ultimate repeal of the licensing acts in 1694. BmaLL, SmEEN LECrURES ON CoPYSee Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1899); Bowker,
RIGHT 51-68 (1899).
COPYRIGHT ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 21-23 (1912) ; DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 54-59 (1879).
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possessed to the exclusion of the whole world.3 8 Of course, a published
literary or musical work is not capable of that type of ownership, as
Mr. Justice Yates pointed out in Millar v. Taylor.3 9 But.property, according to modem concepts, does not necessarily depend on its subject
having these attributes. Even real estate is no longer the subject of
absolute ownership from the center of the earth to the sky. Airplanes
may fly overhead without committing trespass; zoning laws limit the
use to which land may be put. A farmer no longer has the absolute
right to determine what crops he will grow.
On the other hand, such intangible things as good will, the right
of privacy-or the newer right of publicity -- and the right to be
protected against unfair methods of competition are constantly gaining
additional sanctions as our society develops. The law now aims to
protect one who has built up an intangible asset against the marauder
who seeks to reap where another has sown, just as it protects the owner
of real estate against trespassers and vandals. ° When the concept of copyright was first established, authorship
was not yet recognized as one of the professions. It was regarded as
a pastime for wits who had for generations been mere retainers of the
nobility-the court jesters and fools 41 who figure so prominently in
many of Shakespeare's plays. The publishers regarded the author's
output as their exclusive property, having generally purchased all rights
in the work for a lump sum. It remained for a future generation of
authors to insist on the present practice of publication on the basis of a
continuing royalty. Writing on the subject more than a century ago,
the elder D'Israeli devoted a whole chapter to the "Poverty of the
Learned," listing many authors who perished in poverty while their
works were enriching the booksellers.4
This rarely occurs in our
own day. So long as an author's works have a continued public demand, he shares in the earnings of his publisher. But before the Statute
of Anne, protection after first publication was of direct concern only
to the publisher or stationer, as he was then known. It remained for
the Statute of Anne to recognize the author as such. A twenty-eight
year grant from the sovereign to the author or his assignee, with substantial statutory remedies, appeared far better than resort to the declining influence of Stationer's Hall.
38. See DRONE, op. cit. supra note 37, at 2-19.
39. 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769), citing Pufendorf at 2358, 2363, 98
Eng. Rep. at 231, 233 and Coke at 2374, 98 Eng. Rep. at 2j9.
40. There is an excellent discussion of the subject in Nimmer, The Right of
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954).
40a. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956), 104 U. PA. L. REv. 1125.
41. See WILSON, THE COURT WITS OF THE RESTORATION (1948).
42. 1 D'IspAmr, CURIOSITIES OF LITERATURE 48-55 (1833).
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Progress in United States Before 1909 Contrasted With Other
Countries
A brief review of the legislative history of copyright shows that
we have lagged far behind other nations both in according rights to
foreign authors and in the scope of the rights granted to authors generally. Although agitation for recognition of the rights of foreign
authors in the United States had received a great impetus from a committee headed by Henry Clay as early as 1837, copyright protection
was not accorded to them until 1891.1 The Clay committee, which
included Senators Preston, Buchanan, Webster and Ewing, submitted
a report favoring international copyright. The report is a landmark
in developing a sound approach to the rights of foreign authors at a
time when the United States had not yet attained cultural as well as
industrial world leadership. Criticizing our provincial attitude toward
literary property of foreign origin, Mr. Clay wrote:
It being established that literary property is entitled
to legal protection, it results that this protection ought to be afforded wherever the property is situated. A British merchant
brings or transmits to the United States a bale of merchandise,
and the moment it comes within the jurisdiction of our laws, they
throw around it effectual security. But if the work of a British
author is brought to the United States, it may be appropriated by
any resident here, and republished without any compensation
whatever being made to the author. We should be all shocked
if the law tolerated the least invasion of the rights of property
in the case of the merchandise, whilst those which justly belong
to the works of authors are exposed to daily violation, without
the possibility of their invoking the aid of the laws.
The committee thinks that this distinction in the
condition of the two descriptions of property is not just, and that
it ought to be remedied by some safe and cautious amendment of
the law. Already the principle has been adopted, in the patent
laws, of extending their benefits to foreign inventions or improvements. It is but carrying out the same principle to extend the
benefits of our copyright laws to foreign authors. In relation to
the subjects of Great Britain and France, it will be but a measure
of reciprocal justice; for, in both of those countries, our authors
may enjoy that protection of their laws for literary property
which is denied to their subjects here." 4
43. Act of March 3, 1891, c. 565, 26 STAT. 1106.
44. Report on Senate Bill No. 223, February 16, 1837, reprinted in PuTNAm,
THE QUEsTIoN oF COPYRIGHT 326, 327-28 (lst ed. 1891). See also BoWKE, op. cit.
supra note 37, at 341-63; DRONE, op. cit. supra note 37, at 92-96; Kampelnan, The
United States and International Copyright, 41 Am. J.I T'L L. 406, 413-16 (1947);
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Not only were we viewed internationally as a haven for literary
pirates because of our refusal to protect the works of foreign authors,
we were virtually the last of the civilized nations to accord composersdomestic as well as foreign-the right to be compensated for public
performances of their copyrighted musical compositions. Although
such rights were recognized in Great Britain as early as 1842, 45 more
than fifty years elapsed before the United States enacted any legislation
in this field.4 ' Thus in 1909, the right of composers of published musical works to benefit from public performances of those works had
been vouchsafed for only twelve years. Although apparently no one
attempted to enforce the right of public performance of musical works
from 1897 to 1900 4 7-- there had been almost no litigation on the subject since the right was created-the right was restricted in 1909 so
as to limit the scope of the property of owners of musical copyrights to
those performances which were both public and "for profit." 48 The
result was that symphonic and similar concert works which are perSolberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 YALE L.J. 48, 50-57 (1925). For a glimpse
into eighteenth-century piracy by English publishers of nationals' works, see BALL,
THE LAW Op COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 11 (1944).
For problems of
piracy of French works by Belgian publishers, see 1 LADAs, op. Cit. supra note 21, at
14, 24-26. See also Report of British Commission for the Investigation of the Subject of Copyright Appointed by Queen Victoria, May 24, 1878, reprinted in PuTNAm,
op. cit. supra at 212, 267-72.
45. 5 & 6 Vicr. c. 45, § 20 (1842).
46. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, c. 4, 29 STAT. 481.
47. There were three cases in the federal courts which considered the issue of the
right of public performance of copyrighted musical works between 1897 and 1909,
all involving a defense that mimicry constitutes fair use. In no case was recovery
allowed. All involved commercial theatrical uses and therefore cannot be said to
have influenced the whittling down process by which the "for profit" limitation was
introduced in the 1909 Act. The three cases are: Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125
Fed. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903) (Fay Templeton's mimicry of plaintiff's song entitled
Sammy held a fair use of the work) ; Savage v. Hoffman, 159 Fed. 584 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1908) (plaintiff failed to establish a sufficiently clear title to Franz Lehar's The
Merry Widow to support an application for a temporary injunction against alleged
infringement by mimicry of one of the songs in the play) ; Green v. Minzensheimer,
177 Fed. 286 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) (following Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, supra,
under circumstances similar to that case).
48. Copyright Act of 1909, c. 320, 35 STAT. 1075, now 17 U.S.C. § 1 (e) (1952).
The general prohibition against public performance of copyrighted musical compositions without regard to the "profit" element is still the law in Great Britain. The
Copyright Committee of the British Board of Trade, recently reviewing the British
Copyright Act, advocates that this provision remain unchanged. Said the Committee, which included such authorities as F. E. Skone James and the late Sir John
Blake under the chairmanship of H. S. Gregory: "In the first place we had to consider whether the right of public performance in respect of copyright material in the
ordinary sense, i e., the rights protected under Section 1 of the Copyright Act, is justified. We have tome to the conclusion that it is. Plays and musical works are written
to be performed, and dramatists and composers are entitled under all known canons
to derive their incomes from the power to control performance. The fact that these
works have been written is a pre-requisite to their attracting other rights. We make
recommendations elsewhere to meet cases where these rights are used, or alleged to
be used, in a monopolistic manner: otherwise we recommend no alteration in the law
in this respect." Copyright Committee, Report, Cw,. No. 8662, para. 178, at 64
(1952).
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formed primarily by eleemosynary groups have yielded little return to
the composers.
To understand how far we were behind other civilized countries
at that time in according to authors a fair measure of protection, let
us trace parallel developments in international protection of the works
of authors in other countries, especially in protecting the right of public
performance, in eliminating traps causing forfeiture of rights in intellectual creations, and in securing protection for a reasonably adequate
period of time.
As early as 1838, Great Britain had adopted an International
Copyright Act, 49 followed by a statute in 1844 establishing a basis for

full reciprocity between Great Britain and other countries.5"
France and Great Britain soon concluded a convention in 1851 providing for the protection in each country of published works protected
under the laws of the other, including the right of translation. Two
conditions were attached: (1) that such right be expressly reserved on
the title page of the original work, and (2) that the original work be
registered and deposited in one country within three months after
publication in the other.51
When our copyright laws were revised in 1909, we had not yet
reached this stage of international interchange-at least not as to
books in the English language first published abroad.'
Only in 1954,
with our adherence to the Universal Copyright Convention,5 3 did we
abandon the harsh provisions working a complete forfeiture of property
rights in such works first published abroad unless within a limited
period after first publication an American edition was printed and
bound in the United States from type set in this country."4
Abroad, England and France were not alone in subscribing to a
policy of reciprocal protection of the intellectual products of foreign
nationals without burdensome formalities. Before 1909, seventeen
countries had adhered to the Berne Convention and thereby subscribed
to a system under which, without any formalities, works first pub49. 1 & 2 VIcr. c. 59 (1838).
50. 7 & 8 VIcr. c. 12 (1844). This was supplemented by 15 & 16 Vicr. c. 12
(1852) and 38 & 39 Vicr. c. 12 (1875).
51. Paris Convention, Nov. 3, 1851.
52. Copyright Act of 1909, c. 320, §§ 15, 16, 35 STAT. 1078, 1079, now 17 U.S.C.
§§ 16, 17 (1952); 37 C.F.R. § 201.8 (Supp. 1956) (import statements). For a discussion of the manufacturing clause, see Ashford, The Compulsory Manufacturing
Provisions,in ASCAP, FoumRH COPYRIGHT LAw Symposrum 48 (1952).
53. United States instrument of ratification deposited with UNESCO in Paris,
December 6, 1954.
54. The amended 17 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp. III, 1956) became operative as of the
effective date of the Universal Copyright Convention, i.e., September 16, 1955. The
amendment does not apply to works of authors who are United States citizens or
domiciliaries regardless of the place of first publication.
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lished in any member country received the same protection in other
55
member countries as was accorded to works of their own nationals.
Customary formalities had included not only a prescribed form
of notice appearing in all copies of the work, registration of a claim
of copyright, and deposit of copies of the work, but also first publication
in the country where protection was sought, and even domestic manufacture, i.e., printing and binding in such country of all copies of the
work offered for sale therein. 6
Although the United States has at last abandoned certain formalities as applied to nationals of countries adhering to the Universal
Copyright Convention, it has not yet subscribed to the principle
of wholly automatic protection which has been a fundamental tenet of
the Berne Convention since at least 1908. 57
The Buenos Aires Convention of 1910 and the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952 both encompass formalities. In the former,
copies of the work must bear a notation that rights are reserved; 58 the
latter retains this principle, but adopts a uniform method of satisfying
the requirement-the symbol @ accompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor and the year of first publication placed in such manner
and location as to give reasonable notice of claim of copyright.5 9
Liberal Approach to Copyright by Confederate States in Civil War
Although the federal government had failed to adopt the 1837
Clay committee's recommendations urging recognition of the rights of
foreign authors on a reciprocal basis, that principle was adopted by
the Confederate States on March 7, 1861. A resolution empowered
President Jefferson Davis to authorize a commission visiting Europe
to enter into treaty obligations for the extension of international copy55. Great Britain and colonies (1887) ; Germany (1887) ; Belgium (1887);
Spain and colonies (1887); France and colonies (1887); Haiti (1887) (withdrew
1903); Italy (1887); Switzerland (1887); Tunis (1887); Liberia (1908); Luxembourg (1888); Monaco (1889); Montenegro (1893) (withdrew 1900); Norway
(1896); Japan (1899); Denmark (1903); Sweden (1904).
56. Berne Convention, Sept. 9, 1886, arts. II & III, no formalities were required
other than those prescribed by the law of the country of origin. Subsequently,
formalities as a condition for copyright protection were wholly abolished. See
note 14 supra.
57. Ibid. See Mentha, The Berne Union and the Question of Formalities, 3
UNESCO COPYWGHT BuL.. 45 (1950).
58. Art. 3. of the Buenos Aires Convention, Aug. 11, 1910, provided: "The
acknowledgment of a copyright obtained in one State, in conformity with its laws,
shall produce its effects of full right in all other States without the necessity of complying with any other formality, provided always there shall appear in the work a
statement that indicates the reservation of the property right"
59. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, art. I(1). See Schulman,
Another View of Article III of the Universal Copyright Convention, 1953 Wis. L.
REv. 297.
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right privileges to foreign authors on a reciprocal basis.'
Subsequently, an act was passed providing for such copyrights without any
requirement of domestic manufacture such as was incorporated in our
first international copyright act of 1891.1
DURATION OF COPYRIGHT TERM

The PrinciplesInvolved
We have seen that the idea of a term of copyright measured in multiples of fourteen years was a vestige of the time when privileges were
granted as a means of encouraging printers. The fourteen-year term
was then logical, being long enough to train two sets of apprentices in
the new art. In an ideal system of law, the duration of an author's
property rights in literary works would probably have some relation
to the duration of other property rights. It is too late to urge that
authors should have perpetual rights in their works; that was settled
to the contrary by a closely-divided English court I and by our Constitutional mandate that exclusive rights of authors in their works
may be granted by Congress only "for limited Times." '
Some of our greatest legal and literary minds have urged that, in
principle, authors are entitled to enjoy their property rights for the
same period as landowners. Lord Scrutton, one of Great Britain's
outstanding judges, observed:
"Limit in the interests of the State the duration of property in
books, if you like, but recognize that the same arguments may be
used to limit the duration of property in land, the power of bequest at death, and the devolution of the property of an intestate.
And above all, a caution which is most necessary in arguing the
matter, and dealing with questions of so-called 'justice', 'right'
and 'utility', let us be careful that we understand what we mean by
these terms, for though such an investigation may be tedious to
our lofty intellects, perhaps even fatal to our pet arguments, it will
certainly result in greater clearness and brevity, and less idle
declamation." v
60. 1

J. OF THE CONG. OF THE CONFED. STATES

61. Act of May 21, 1861, c. 65, 6

113 (1904).

STATS. AT LARGE OF THE CoNFm. STATES OF

157 (Matthews ed. 1864) (Prov. Cong. 2d Sess.). For an excellent
analysis of the attitude of the southern states toward copyright, see Page, Copyright
AmEmICA

Laws in Georgia, in ASCAP, SECOND COPYRIGHT LAW SymposiUm

(1940).

151, 156-59

62. Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Brown P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774);
Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769). See HAsARD,

PAPL. HIST. ENG. 954-1003 (1774).
63. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 8.
64. Sc U'ToN, op. cit. supra note 28, 290-92.
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Our ideal term of copyright must therefore be for a limited period
of time, but should be as long as is commensurate with the public in-.
terest. The great public interest behind the enactment of copyright
laws is the encouragement of authors by giving them the opportunity
of obtaining fair rewards for their labors. It is submitted that the test
should be, not how little may be vouchsafed to the author as a means of
such encouragement, but rather, what should the public consider as a
fair reward for the contributions made by authorship to society? Our
answer must depend on (a) the scope of the rights given, (b) the
periods of protection in other fields of human endeavor, (c) historical
considerations, (d) experience in other countries and (e) our national
interest in both its domestic and international aspects.
What have been the arguments pro and con over the years?
What validity do those arguments have today? Perhaps the most
eloquent and certainly the most effective argument against extending
the term of copyright was made by Lord Macaulay more than a century ago, at a time when the term of copyright was twenty-eight years
from the date of publication but not less than the life of the author.
Sergeant Talfourd proposed a term of life plus sixty years. Macaulay's
opposition centered on five points: (1) No rights of property should
survive death except to the extent that parliament deems proper. (2)
Except for a system of patronage, which is undesirable, copyright
is the only known means of encouraging professional authors, but
copyright is a monopoly and monopolies are evil. "For the sake of
the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last
a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good."
(3) Copyright laws impose "a tax on readers for the purpose of
giving a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it
is a tax on one of the most innocent and most salutary of human
pleasures; and never let us forget, that a tax on innocent pleasures
is a premium on vicious pleasures." (4) A publisher will pay little
more for a copyright having a duration of life plus sixty years than
for one of life plus twenty-five years. "From the very nature of
literary property it will almost always pass away from an author's
family; and . . . the price given for it to the family will bear a
very small proportion to the tax which the purchaser, if his speculation
turns out well, will in the course of a long series of years levy on the
public." (5) If the copyright does not fall in the hands of booksellers, but remains in the family, it may produce an even greater
evil--"many valuable works will be either totally suppressed or
grievously mutilated." "
65. 5 MAcAULAY, CouLcrm WoRxs 228

(1899).
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These arguments must be examined in the light of both experience and logic. First, let us review the experience of the leading
countries and the term now prevailing in most of the enlightened
countries of the world.
General Development Before 1909
The United States and Great Britain
Exactly two centuries had elapsed between the Statute of Anne
and the United States Copyright Law of 1909. At the time of the
birth of our nation, when we looked to the mother country for the
pattern of our laws, the term of copyright in Great Britain had not
changed since the Statute of Anne. It was still two terms of fourteen
years each. Before our own Constitution was ratified, Congress recommended that the several states enact copyright laws providing for
an initial term of not less than fourteen years and a renewal of not less
than fourteen years." Connecticut and Maryland had previously provided for two terms of fourteen years each;

7

Massachusetts had pro-

vided for a single term of twenty-one years.6" Nine other states
subsequently enacted similar copyright laws. 9 Our first national
copyright act, following this pattern, provided for two terms of fourteen years each.Y°
Across the seas, more than a century after enactment of the Statute of Anne, the initial term was extended to twenty-eight years with
a renewal to the author, if living, for the remainder of his life.71 This
was the first departure in Great Britain from a period measured exclusively from the date of publication; it was the earliest recognition
by the Anglo-Saxon world that an author's property rights should
remain inviolate for at least as long as he remained alive, a concept
first introduced, as we have seen, during the French revolution.
That principle has never been adopted in the United States. Rather,
the fixed terms dating from publication have been enlarged from time
to time. In 1831 the initial term was extended to twenty-eight years
66. 8 J. oF CONG. 189 (1800) (Resolution of May 2, 1783).
67. Connecticut, Act of Jan. 1783, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BULL. No. 3, COPYRIGHT
ENACrMENTS OF THE UNIT
STATES 1783-1906, at 11 (2d ed. 1906); Maryland,
Act of April 21, 1783, id. at 15.
68. Act of March 17, 1783, 1 LAws OF MASS. 94 (1807).
69. New Jersey (fourteen plus fourteen), Act of May 27, 1783, COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, op. cit. supra note 67, at 16; New Hampshire (twenty years), Act of
Nov. 7, 1783, id. at 18; Rhode Island (twenty-one years), Act of Dec. 1783, id. at
19; Pennsylvania (fourteen plus fourteen), Act of March 15, 1784, id. at 20; South
Carolina (fourteen plus fourteen), Act of March 26, 1784, id. at 21; Virginia
(twenty-one years), Act of Oct. 1785, id. at 24.
70. Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15, 1 STAT. 124.
71. 54 GEo. 3, c. 156, § 4 (1814).
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(as in Great Britain), but until 1909 the renewal period remained
a specific term of fourteen years to the author or his surviving widow
or children."
In the meantime, there was adopted in England a term of life
plus seven years or forty-two years from the date of publication, whichever should prove longer. 73 This was the outcome of a spirited debate
in which the champion of the authors was Sergeant Talfourd, seeking
a term of life plus sixty years; the opponents were led by Lord
Macaulay.
This was obviously better for authors than the term of twentyeight plus fourteen years then prevailing in the United States. For
the second successive time, the British copyright law protected the
author for the minimum period of his lifetime.
There was no further change in the United States until the general revision of the law in 1909; 7 nor in Great Britain until the
general revision of 1911.71

Other Countries
In France the term of the author's life plus five years was extended
76
in 1793 to ten years after death, and in 1866 to fifty years after death.
The Italian law of 1885 provided for a term of life and forty years,
or a minimum of eighty years from the date of first publication. If
the author died before the lapse of forty years after first publication,
others could reprint the work during the final forty-year period upon
paying to the author's heirs or representatives five per cent of the published price of each copy."'
As the table below indicates, by the time our 1909 law was enacted, every major country of the world except the United States and
Holland (including the Dutch East Indies) granted protection to the
author at least for the period of his life. At the present time, 38 of
the 60 countries having copyright laws provide for a term of life and
fifty years or longer. The countries having the shortest terms at
present are Russia (life and fifteen years) and the United States
(twenty-eight years from publication plus an additional term of
twenty-eight years). No country today has a term shorter than life
and fifteen years, except Bulgaria and Yugoslavia where the rights
terminate upon the author's death if he does not leave a widow or
children under twenty-one (Bulgaria) or twenty-five (Yugoslavia).
72. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 STAT. 436.
73. 5 & 6 Vicr. c. 45, § 3 (1842).
74. Copyright Act of 1909, c. 320, 35 STAT. 1075, now 17 U.S.C. §§ 24, 25
(1952).
75. British Copyright Act, 1911, 2 GEo. 5, c. 46, §§ 3 and 4.
76. WEm, op. cit. supra note 34 at 785, 791.
77. Translation of statute in COPINGER, LAw

OF COPYMRGHT

755-67 (3d ed. 1893).
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The following chart, showing the present periods of copyright
duration throughout the world in contrast with the terms prevailing
before the enactment of our 1909 revision, indicates a decided trend
toward a term of life and fifty years: 7
Pre-1909 Period

-Present Day Period

Perpetual
Egypt (?)
Guatemala
Mexico
Nicaragua
Venezuela
Life and 80 Years
Colombia
Cuba
Spain

Colombia
Cuba
Spain

None

Brazil

Life and 60 Years
Life and 50 Years
Belgium
Bolivia
Costa Rica
Denmark
Ecuador
Finland
France

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Costa Rica
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
Finland
France (plus period of
two world wars)
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Guatemala

78. For the pre-1909 situation, see table submitted by Herbert Putnam, Librarian
of Congress, in Hearings before the Joint Committees on Patents on S. 6330 and
HR. 19853 To Amend and Consolidate The Acts Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong.,
1st Sess. 401 (1906); CoLLEs & HARDY, PLAYRIGHT AND COPYRIGHT IN ALL
COUNTRIES 62-63, 112-15 (1906); and COPINGER, LAw OF COPYRIGHT 495-759 (4th
ed. 1904)., The situation after the British Copyright Act of 1911 is detailed in
Bow=a, op. cit. supra note 37, at xi-xiv. For the present day situation, see the
charts in 2 UNESCO COPYRIGHT BuLL. 70-81 (1949) and Dubin, The Universal
Copyright Convention, 42 Casu. L. Ray. 89 (1954).
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Pre-1909 Period
Life and 50 Years (con'td)
Hungary

Luxembourg
Monaco
Norway

Present Day Period
Hungary
Iceland
India
Israel
Ireland
Italy (plus period of
two world wars)
Lebanon
Luxembourg
Monaco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Paraguay

Portugal
Russia
Sweden
Syria
Tunis
Turkey
Union of South Africa
Life and 40 Years
None

Uruguay

Life and 30 Years
Argentina
Austria
Bolivia
China
Dominican Republic
Germany
Japan
Nicaragua

Switzerland

Japan
Rumania
Siam
Sweden
Switzerland
Venezuela

Life and 25 Years
Salvador

-Salvador

Life and 20 Years
Peru

Liberia
Mexico
Peru
Poland
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Present Day Period

Life and 15 Years
None

Soviet Union

Rumania

None

Australia
Great Britain
India
Natal
New South Wales
New Zealand
Siam
South Australia
Victoria
Western Australia

None

Italy (subject to 5%
compulsory license
for last 40 years)

None

Turkey

None

Haiti (if children, 20
years; if no children, 10 years)

Haiti (if children, 20
years; if no children,
10 years)
Bulgaria (until children
reach 21)
Yugoslavia (until children reach 25)

Brazil
Holland and
Dutch E. Indies

None

Life and 10 Years

Life and 7 Years
with 42 Year
Minimum

Life or 80 Years

Life or 40 Years
Lives of Author and
Surviving Spouse
plus specified period

50 Years
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Pre-1909 Period.

Present Day Period

28 Years and 14
Year Renewal
Canada
United States
Newfoundland

None

None

United States

None

Philippines

28 Years and 28
Year Renewal
30 Years and 30
Year Renewal

The trend toward standardizing the period of copyright protection
at life and fifty years accords with the period prescribed in the Berne
Convention, as modified at Brussels in 1948."9 Such a term protects
the author's widow and children or other beneficiaries for a reasonable
period beyond the author's death. In an age and country where all
are conscious of the importance of life insurance, this is not too generous a gesture to authors.
Macaulay's argument that no property rights should survive death
in the absence of express statute cannot command much sympathy in
our day. Opponents of a longer term of copyright have reiterated
Macaulay's argument that a copyright is a monopoly; that monopolies
are odious and that therefore "the evil [monopoly] ought not to last
a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good
[encouraging professional authors]." This assumes that a copyright
confers a monopoly in the sense that a patent does-that is, that the
whole world is excluded from the field covered by the copyright even
though another author may arrive at the same result independently.
This is true in the case of patents but not as to copyrights. Two cases
in which opinions were written by the most outstanding judges of the
century illustrate this important difference. In the first, Arnstein v.
Edward B. Marks Music Corp., Judge Learned Hand observed that
"independent reproduction of a copyrighted musical work is not infringement," and that therefore it is "contrary to the very foundation
of copyright law" to assert that "copyrights, like patents, are monopo79. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
signed on September 9, 1886, revised at Brussels on June 26, 1948. See Fisher, The
1948 Revision of the Berne Convention, 10 FED. Com. B.J. 53 (1949).
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lies of the contents of the work." I In other words, copyrights, unlike
patents, do not confer such a monopoly.
Turning now to a patent case, in which there had been a race between four distinguished inventors working independently on the
important radio feedback circuit, Lee DeForest was held to have had
the good fortune to arrive bifore the others. In announcing this decision, Justice Cardozo could not help but lament the plight of those
who failed, remarking, "The prize of an exclusive patent falls to the
one who had the fortune to be first. .

.

. The others gain nothing

for all their toil and talents." 81
The decision would have been otherwise if the issue had been between four authors rather than between four inventors; as Judge Hand
pointed out, if several authors independently create substantially the
same play or other literary or musical work, each may secure a copyright without infringing on the other's rights.
The remaining argument advanced by Macaulay and his successors against extending the term of copyright is that it would benefit
publishers rather than writers and their families. This may have been
a valid argument in the days when authors sold all their rights to
publishers outright for a lump sum. But that is rarely done today.
In any event, the writer's family may be protected, if that is desirable.
It could be provided that no assignment by an author should be valid
for more than a given period unless the basis of payment is a royalty
commensurate with the prevailing scale or a statutory scale. It might
also be provided that no rights should continue beyond the present
fifty-six year period unless the author has a widow or children or other
prescribed next of kin surviving, or has bequeathed the rights to a
charitable, religious or educational institution.
ADVANTAGES OF COMPUTING TRM ON BASIS OF LIFE OF AUTHOR
PLUS PERIOD OF YEARS

The copyright laws have contributed greatly to the development
of the literary profession. The resulting financial independence of the
writing fraternity has helped to supply innocent pursuits for the leisure
hours made available in our machine age. In fact, the product of the
present-day author, as we may see nightly on television programs,
helps to sell automobiles, refrigerators, washing machines, cigarettes,
soap, perfumes, beer, etc.
80. 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936).
81. Radio Corporation of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293

U.S. 1, 3 (1934).
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There was a time when extension of the term of copyright was
considered a tax on the public, who were the purchasers of booksthe main outlet for authorship. Today's consumer is largely the motion picture producer (who is both creator and user of the output of
authorship), manufacturers of goods advertised on radio and television,
the theatre-goer who pays $8.80 for a seat at a Broadway musical and
finally, of course, the relatively diminishing number of readers. Without authors, there would likely be no radio and television programs
and no great industries manufacturing the remarkable apparatus for
such mass communication.
Authors receive only a small fraction of the amount spent for
entertainment in our time. The annual royalties paid to all authors
probably do not equal the yearly payments for broadcast advertising
by a single large advertiser.a2
Lord Macaulay's argument that a long term of copyright-indeed
any term after death-was no inducement to authorship is not valid
today. We can only speculate upon the extent to which Macaulay
may have been influenced by the fact that "he had no wife, nor child,
nor even a dog." The question, however, is not whether a given term
of copyright will serve as an inducement to the creation of new works,
but rather, whether fairness to authors does not demand that their
rights be vouchsafed for as long a period as is consonant with the
mores of modem society. Today, authors do not turn over all their
rights to the booksellers for a lump sum. Their concern for their own
future and that of their families is just as great as that of the industrial
executive who carefully provides for a substantial pension in the winter
of life and sufficient life insurance to take care of his loved ones after
his death.
The typical agreement between composers of music and their publishers provides that all rights "shall revert to the writer upon expiration of the original term of the United States copyright or at the end
of twenty-eight years from the date of publication in the United States,
whichever period shall be shorter." Grants of dramatic rights to stage
managers or producers are usually for even a shorter period. In fact,
they are not grants, but mere "leases." The author reserves all rights
not expressly leased to the manager. This method of dealing with
theatrical properties would have shocked the managers of Macaulay's
era, for the copyright law did not give any protection whatsoever to
dramatic rights (i.e., the right of stage presentation) until Bulwer
Lytton's Act of 1833.8
82. Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public Interest-Regulation of Performing Right Societies, 19 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 275, 281 (1954).
83. 3 & 4 WIIL. 4, c. 15. See DRoNEy, COPYRIGET 11-12 (8th ed. 1948).
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If it is fair that an author should be able to leave to his loved ones
the right to receive income froi the works created by him, then the author should be given as long a term of copyright as experience has
shown practical." Our sister democracies have found a term of life
and fifty years to be a reasonable period. Great Britain was apparently not so convinced in 1911, when the present law was enacted;
Parliament then provided for a compulsory license during the last
twenty-five years of the copyright term. But no one has found it
necessary to demand such a license, and Parliament is about to do away
with it. In recommending this step, the Copyright Committee of the
Board of Trade in its Report to Parliament in October, 1952, found
(p. 9):
"We have received evidence, which we see no reason to challenge, that as a matter of general practice publishers do not wait
for 25 years from the date of publication, let alone for 25 years
after the death of the author, before they issue a cheap edition of
works in popular demand. We are aware of instances to the
contrary but, in general, we believe that this is the case. The publication of works in such series as 'Everyman's Library,' the
'World's Classics' or the 'Penguin Library,' all indicate that where
it is not the practice of the original publisher himself to reach a
new public by the issue of cheap editions under his own name, it
is the generally accepted practice of the trade to authorise the issue
of cheaper editions to the public, long before the period of unqualified protection prescribed in the Act has expired. So far as
concerns the provisions of Section 4 of the Copyright Act, we
understand that no applications have ever been made to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council for their authority to issue works
of deceased authors."
In addition to these considerations, we may briefly note the following advantages of a term measured by the author's life plus a period
of years:
1. It avoids the necessity of distinguishing between "published"
and "unpublished" works.
2. A copyright notice is unnecessary.
be avoided

Therefore forfeitures will

84. Judge Yankwich, after quoting Mr. Justice Willes' admonition that "'he who
engages in a laborious work (such, for instance, as Johnson's Dictionary) which may
employ his whole life, will do it with more spirit, if, besides his own glory, he
thinks it may be a provision for his family.' (. . . Millar v. Taylor, 1769, 4 Burr.
2303, 2335, 98 Engl. Rep. (Reprint) 201, 218)," observes: "In adapting the rules of
literary property to the present era of swift communication and constant changes in
public taste, it is well to remember the admonition from an older practitioner of the
art of judicature." Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11
F.R.D. 457, 486 n.64 (1951).
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(a) In case of improper notice of copyright, or
(b) In case of failure to file . a timely application for renewal.
3. It protects the living author and his dependents against a form
of unfair competition to which they are now exposed .in cases where
some of an author's works have fallen into the public domain but others
are still protected. In such cases, users are inclined to resort to the
author's royalty-free works, thus discriminating against and discouraging the use of those that are still entitled to copyright protection.
4. It would eliminate one of the greatest fields of controversy, the
question of who is entitled to the renewal term of copyright for the
second twenty-eight year period.8 5
5. It would promote international understanding by bringing our
views in line with leading democracies.
This last item-promoting international understanding-must
not be minimized. The storm of protest that arises whenever a great
foreign work is appropriated in America (before copyright expires at
home) is well illustrated in an article in a recent issue of Revue Inte2nationale Du Droit D'Auteur (July 1955), entitled "Twilight of the
Classics" by Olav Lid, Secretary-General of Norwegian Radio-diffusion. Pointing out that Edvard Grieg died in 1908, and that his works
will fall into the public domain in 1958, Mr. Lid recommended a further extension of copyright for a period equal to the war years, as
has already been done in France and Italy. In insisting that, as regards
the works of foreign nationals, this should be conditioned on reciprocity,
he pointed an accusing finger at the United States, saying:
"Most of us can still remember the reaction provoked by the
Americans' lack of piety for Grieg's music in Song of Norway.
Grieg's works being still protected in all the countries having
adhered to the Berne Convention, we have been able, in Norway,
to avoid being faced with such an act of vandalism towards the
music of the Master. But it will be hardly possible after 1st
85. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F2d 569
(2d Cir.), nodified, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951);
Rossiter v. Vogel, 148 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1945); Edward B. Marks Corp. v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1944); Edward B. Marks Corp.
v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944); Edward B. Marks
Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944); Shapiro, Bern-

stein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1941); Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc.,
98 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 650 (1938); Harris v. Coca-Cola
Co., 73 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 709 (1935); WhiteSmith Music Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 Fed. 247 (1st Cir. 1911); cases cited
in note 23 supra.
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January 1958 to hinder the commercial prostitution of this music,
a prostitution which has given magnificent financial results in
America." ,
Considering the present international situation and the necessity
of strengthening the leadership which we are now taking in world
culture, a reappraisal of the period of protection of authors' rights in
the light of developments abroad would be most timely. This would
be particularly significant as a sequel to our approval of the Universal
7
Copyright Convention.
OTHER SUGGESTED REVISIONS OF THE ACT OF

1909

Formalities-Avoidance of Forfeitures
With the development of new means of mass communication, the
reasons for the requirement of a copyright notice are no longer valid.
Consider, e.g., the following:
(a) It is not required on phonograph records, tape recordings, etc.
(b) It is not visible in television.
(c) Notice does not aid the user if the work is not registeredand registration is not required. The work may be registered under another title, or as part of a larger work. In
these cases a notice is useless.
The role of formalities in international copyright has already been
considered.'
Now let us examine its domestic implications. As
Judge Learned Hand reminds us in National Comics Publications v.
Fawcett Publications,9 a forfeiture results whenever a work falls into
the public domain because of failure to comply with statutory formalities. As he points out, we may conceal the harshness of the results
86. Lid, Twilight of

the Classics, 8

REvuE

INTERNATIoNALE

86 (1955).
87. Act of Aug. 31, 1954, c. 116, 68 STAT. 1030.

Du

DRoiT

D'AUTEUR

See Cary, The Universal
Copyright Convention and the United States Public Law 743, 8 UNESCO
COPYRIGHT BuLL. 5 (1955).
The Universal Copyright Convention became effec-

tive September 16, 1955, three months after the deposit of ratification by
Monaco, which was the twelfth country to adhere to the Convention. See Universal
Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, art.

IX.

Countries which had previously ratified

the Convention were Andorra, Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, German Federal Republic,
Haiti, Israel, Laos, Pakistan, Spain and the United States. The Holy See, Luxemburg, France, Japan (effective April 28, 1956), and Switzerland (effective March
30, 1956) joined the Convention subsequent to Monaco. See Finkestein, The Universal Copyright Convention, 2 Am. J. ComP. L. 98 (1953); Hein, The Quest for International Copyright Protection, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 43 (1953); Schulman, Inter-

national Copyright in the United States, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 141 (1954).
88. See text at pp. 1040-41 supra.
89. 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951), opinion clarified, 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1952) (where the proprietor of the copyright of the comic strip "Superman" failed

to place notice of copyright on certain strips, a forfeiture resulted as to these particular strips but not as to other "Superman" strips). See Reeves, Superman v.
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by labeling it "dedication" or "abandonment" of rights, but so long as
there is no intent to dedicate or abandon, those terms do not appropriately describe the legal consequences of non-compliance with formalities.
Assuming that certain formalities may be desirable, it is fair to question
whether the penalty of absolute forfeiture of all property rights in the
work is a proper or necessary sanction. The only purpose of a copyright notice or registration is to warn a user that the owner of the
work has not authorized its reproduction without special permission.
It is submitted that a notice of copyright is not the only means of
placing a user on notice; that registration of a claim of copyright would
serve an equal, if not a more effective purpose; and that in any event
omission of the notice or failure to register should not be a defense to
anyone who is not an "innocent" infringer. Consideration should be
given to the suggestion that in order to encourage registration of
works, those who fail to do so may be denied certain remedies, such as
statutory damages-or possibly the recovery of any damages-for
infringements commenced prior to registration. This was the scheme
proposed in the Vestal Bill which passed the House of Representatives
Captain Marvel; or, Loss of Literary Property in Comic Strips, in ASCAP, CopySome of the cases in which the
RIGHT LAW SymPosium: NUMBER FIV 3 (1954).
failure to comply with formalities resulted in forfeiture are: Dejonge & Co. v.
Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33 (1914) (copyright lost where notice of copyright
was placed on only one square of a painting reproduced in eleven other squares
as wrapping paper); Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265 (1903) (authorized appearance
of Harriet Beecher Stowe's Minister's Wooing in a magazine without notice of
copyright vitiated the copyright previously taken out by the author); Holmes v.
Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899) (serial publication of Dr. Holmes' book The Autocrat
of the Breakfast Table in a magazine without copyright notice vitiated a copyright
of the whole book obtained subsequently but prior to the publication of the book as
an entirety) ; Krafft v. Cohen, 117 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1941) (first copies of a pamphlet
which were printed with copyright notice only on the back cover and which lacked
the name of the proprietor constituted an abandonment of copyright); Smith v.
Wilkinson, 97 F.2d 506 (1st Cir. 1938) (microscopic notice which was indistinguishable
from scroll on a series of prints resulted in improper notice) ; Horsman & Aetna Doll
Co. v. Kaufman, 286 Fed. 372 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 615 (1923)
(notice fatally defective when plaintiff had given notice as prescribed by the statute
for a work of art, i.e., "c" in a circle accompanied by initials of copyright owner, but
had neglected to place his name on the back, base margin-or pedestal of the work) ;
Herbert v. Shanley, 229 Fed. 340 (2d Cir. 1916), affirming 222 Fed. 344 (S.D.N.Y.
1915), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (publication of one of the serial
songs of a copyrighted dramatico-musical work without copyright notice of the entire
work resulted in forfeiture of that portion of the work) ; Metro Associated Services
v. Webster City Graphic, 117 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Iowa 1953) (copyright forfeited
whben plaintiff advertising service distributed its mats with a small "c" in a circle
surrounded by a capital "M" without the name of plaintiff as copyright proprietor,
and permitted its subscribers to publish the mats without designating the plaintiff
as copyright proprietor); Group Publishers, Inc. v. Winchell, 86 F. Supp. 573
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (substitution of the assignee's name in the copyright notice prior
to recordation of the assignment resulted in an abandonment of plaintiff's copyright
in the book The Romance of Money); Wildman v. New Yo-k Times Co., 42 F. Supp.
412 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (failure to include the year of copyright in the notice of copyright on the printed verse "Remember This" resulted in a forfeiture) ; United Thrift
Plan, Inc. v. National Thrift Plan, Inc., 34 F.2d 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1929) (notice placed
on the bottom of the last page of pamphlet was misplaced and a forfeiture, and was not
saved by § 20 as an accident or mistake). For cases in which forfeitures resulted
from a licensee's attempts to copyright a work in his own name, see note 17 su ra.
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in 1931.' In reporting this bill to the Senate on February 23, 1931,
Senator Hebert of Louisiana, Chairman of the Committee on Patents,
wrote: 91
"While under the provisions of the bill, authors are entitled
to automatic copyright upon their works immediately they are created, there is a provision for the registration of copyright and the
recording of assignments, licenses, etc. The ownership of a copyright is not made dependent upon its registration, or upon any
other formality, but the bill provides that in case of failure to
record a copyright, or to give notice thereof, such omission will
excuse innocent infringers from the payment of any damages.
In such cases the owner of the copyright is limited to a right of
injunction. It is believed that the provisions of this section afford
a distinct advantage to the owners of copyright. Under the act
of 1909 a simple mistake in a copyright notice made by a printer's
devil in a publishing house might invalidate the entire right of the
author or of the publisher therein. Thus he might lose all his
rights through no fault of his own. The pending bill protects the
copyright under all circumstances by its automatic provision so
that no one may be deprived thereof unless he wills to do so. His
failure to register his claim to copyright, or to give notice of it
upon the publication of it will not affect his claim, though it will
under the provisions of the bill affect his right to recover damages
in case of infringement. In these respects the simple requirements
for recordation and notice are not unlike the laws in force in all
the States in relation to land titles."
This principle was adhered to in the Thomas Bill.

2

Rights in Musical Compositions
The Right of Public Performance
Before 1833, all copyrighted works could be performed in Great
Britain without permission of the copyright owner. This was remedied
that year as to dramatic works,9 although then, as now, legislation was
slow in catching up with the spirit of the times. It was in 1822 that
Lord Eldon had held that there was no remedy against an unauthor90. H.R. 12549, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1931). This would seem to resolve the
dilemma posed by a noted authority who observed that "perhaps it is possible to
attain both automatic copyright and recordation of ownership, but the task challenges
the resourcefulness of statutory draftsmen." Chafee, Reflections on Copyright Law,
45 CoLum. L. Rnv. 503, 515 (1945).
91. S. REP. No. 1732, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931), reprinted in 34 Runis=a o,
COPYRIGHTS ANN. REP. 77, 95 (1931).
92. S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), prepared as a result of a long series
of conferences under the chairmanship of Prof. James T. Shotwell.
93. Act Relating to Dramatic Literary Property, 3 & 4 WmLu. 4, c. 15 (1833);
extended to include musical entertainment in 1842, 5 & 6 Vir. c. 45.
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ized performance of Lord Byron's copyrighted Marino Faliero given
at the Drury Lane Theatre. 94 After eleven years of agitation for
statutory relief, Parliament finally recognized that a dramatist would
have little encouragement if he were denied performing rights.95
Eleven years may seem a long time to wait for a legislative body
to cure an existing evil, but the waiting period in the United States was
much longer.' We seem to move with greater speed than any other
nation in making industrial strides, but our energies seem to fail us
when seeking to catch up with the rest of the world in safeguarding the
rights of authors.
Though Great Britain has been ahead of us in its respect for
authorship, France advanced more rapidly both in developing its literature and music, and in taking measures for the effective protection of
its authors. As early as 1653, thanks to the efforts of the playwright
Tristan, French dramatic authors had succeeded in making a voluntary
arrangement with theatrical players whereby the authors received a
royalty of one-ninth of the receipts of a play during its first run, after
which it became the players' property absolutely.97 This arrangement
was later embodied in a government decree of 1697198 and re-enacted
with certain modifications in 1757.1 Under the latter statute, if the
receipts fell below 1200 livres on two successive evenings in winter or
800 livres in summer, the play could be closed without the author's
consent, and its run deemed terminated, so that the performing rights
in the play then became the absolute property of the players. Lemaitre
thus describes the means used to cheat the author: 100
"The actors used all sorts of tricks to cheat the playwrights
of even their slight legal share. Thus, when a play seemed likely
to be successful, the actors would present it twice in succession
when they knew that some important function was taking place
at court. The courtiers, who always bought the most expensive
seats, naturally stayed away from the theatres on those days. The
receipts would be low, the play would fall 'within the rules,' and
the actors would present it again and again without having to pay
the author a single sou. Furthermore, in calculating the receipts,
the actors regularly left out important items-for instance, the
price of loges rented by the year-so the unfortunate authors were
94. Murray v. Elliston, 5 Barn. & Ald. 657, 106 Eng. Rep. 1331 (KB. 1822).

95. See

PHmLis, LAw Op COPYRIGaT

182 (1863).

96. Perforning rights in dramatic works were
States by the Act of Aug. 18, 1856, c. 169, 11 STAT.
tended to musical compositions until the Act of Jan.
97. 1 HAWKINs, AiNAIs OF THE FR-xcH STAGE
98. 2 id. at 339-40.
99. LzmArr=, BEAu ARc!Has 254 (1949).
100. Id. at 254-55.

first recognized in the United
138, but the right was not ex6, 1897, c. 4, 29 STAT. 481.
186-87 (1884).
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lucky if they received one-twentieth of the money the actors pocketed. Finally, to avoid unpleasant discussions, the actors never
offered a playwright a detailed statement of account, but gave him
a lump sum that they said was his share. If he was so ill-advised as
to protest, some actress particularly well-acquainted with Richelieu
or Duras would see to it that the man was promptly put into his
place."
The players made the mistake of practicing these artifices on
Beaumarchais in 1776 and 1777, while he was busy sending supplies
overseas to aid the American Revolution and, at the same time, composing The Marriage of Figaro. Beaumarchais was never too preoccupied to fight every inch of the way against any kind of injustice.
He ultimately succeeded in doing two things: (1) securing a new
decree of the Conseil d'Etat in 1780 giving playwrights a larger
royalty, i.e., one-seventh of the receipts, including rental of loges and
all money paid by the spectators (but the minimum figure of daily
receipts below which the play became the property of the players was
raised from 1200 to 2300 livres in winter, and from 800 to 1800 livres
in summer); and (2) organizing the French Societe des Auteurs
Dramatique, which to this day protects French dramatic authors
against abuses of managers.'"
Governmental regulation of the playwrights' share was abandoned
during the French Revolution; a 1791 law prohibited public performances of authors' works during their lives and for a period of five years
after death in the absence of written consent of the author or his heirs.
It further provided that in case of infringement the infringer's box
office receipts would be confiscated in favor of the author.102 The
term of protection was enlarged in 1793 to a period of ten years after
death. The French copyright law has not required revision as new
scientific developments brought new means of reproducing copyrighted
works, since a distinction has never been drawn in France between
such forms of reproduction as copying, performing or recording
mechanically or electrically.'
In the United States no right of performance was accorded until
the Act of 1856, which applied only to dramatic works.,
As pointed
out above, such rights were first accorded to copyrighted musical compositions in 1897.10"
101. Id. at 255-59.
102. Acts of Jan. 13-19, 1791 and July 19-Aug. 7, 1791, translation in WEm.,
op. cit. supra note 34, at 783-84 (1917).
103. LOWNDEs, Ax HisroicAr. SxErcn OF LAw OF THE COPYRIGHT 117 (2d ed.
1842).
104. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, c. 169, 11 STAT. 138.
105. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, c. 4, 29 STAT. 481.

19561

THE COPYRIGHT LAW-A REAPPRAISAL

When the 1909 Act introduced the "for profit" limitation as applied to public performances of musical compositions, it put those compositions in a class inferior to "dramatico-musical" works. Thus
symphonic works which are often performed publicly, but not for
profit, yield little return to the composers. There is no reason for this
discrimination. It is unique in our law, and should be corrected.
Exemption of Coin-Operated Machines
Another discriminatory and anachronistic feature of the Copyright Act is the exemption accorded coin-operated machines in section
1(e)y o. Under this exemption, which first appeared in the 1909 Act,
the performance of a musical composition by means of a coin-operated
machine, in a place where admission is not charged, is not deemed a
public performance for profit.
The present-day juke box was unknown when the so-called coinoperated machine exemption was written into the 1909 Act. Nevertheless, today the juke box industry, whose income is directly attributable to public performances of copyright musical works for profit, pays
nothing to the copyright owners of such musical works for these
performances. Of all commercial users of copyrighted music, only the
juke box industry is permitted, through this outmoded provision of
the copyright law, to exploit the creative efforts of composers and
authors without payment. Elimination of this inconsistency in our
law has been widely recommended during the past few years by various
bar associations, the Copyright Office, the Department of State and
many other groups.Y0 7 Recent legislative proposals to repeal the coinoperated machine exemption failed of enactment. 0 8
106. 17' U.S.C. § 1(e) (1952).
107. The Register of Copyrights, the American Bar Association, the American
Patent Law Association, the Federal Bar Associations of New York, New Jersey
and Connecticut, the Chicago Bar Association, the American Book Publishers Council,
the National Music Council, the National Federation of Music Clubs and others have
endorsed the repeal of the coin-operated machine exemption. See, e.g., Hearings
Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5473,
82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 11, pt. 1, at 56-61, 80-81, 94-95 (1951) ; Hearings Before
Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5473, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11, pt. 2, at 117, 367-79 (1952) ; HearingsBefore a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S.1106, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 17-20,
28-36, 49, 174-77 (1953).
108. S. 590, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced January 21, 1955 by Senators
Kilgore, Kefauver, Morse, Langer, Barrett, Humphrey, O'Mahoney, Johnston of
South Carolina, Payne and Neely; H.R. 4316, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced
February 23, 1955 by Congressman Thompson of New Jersey; H.R. 6654, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess., introduced on June 6, 1955 by Congressman Murray of Illinois; H.R. 6855,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced on June 15, 1955 by Congressman Philbin of
Massachusetts; H.R 6890, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced on June 16, 1955 by
Congressman Delaney of New York.
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Compulsory Recording License
Prior to 1909, a copyright did not protect the owner from unauthorized recordings of his work on phonograph records or music
rolls." 9 It appeared in the 1906-09 hearings that if an exclusive right
to record musical works was to be given, the Aeolian Company, a
manufacturer of music rolls, would have a monopoly because it had
bought up rights in so many compositions. Under the circumstances,
Congressman Charles G. Washburn of Massachusetts introduced a
compromise measure which has been the subject of controversy ever
since. It provides, "[W]henever the owner of a musical copyright has
used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted
work upon the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically
the musical work, any other person may make similar use of the
copyrighted work upon the payment to the copyright proprietor of a
royalty of 2 cents on each such part manufactured, to be paid by the
manufacturer thereof ..
." 110
In recommending that this clause be eliminated, the late Register
of Copyrights, Thorvald Solberg, quoted the following letter written
by Mr. Washburn on April 2, 1926:
"That royalty clause was a 'makeshift' made necessary to get
the bill through. Without it, there would have been no copyright
legislation in 1909. The author should have 'complete control'
of his rights. -The constitutional right expressed in the provision
that Congress may secure for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries
should, if exercised, not be abridged by legislation-that I believe
to be a sound principle." "l
Other subjects to which attention has been directed in connection
with the prospective general revision of the copyright law are indivisibility of copyright 1 2 and common law rights in unpublished
18
works.
Divisibility
Under our copyright law, an author may transfer the legal title
to his copyright only in totality; the copyright may not be split up
and partially assigned as to the various rights encompassed therein." 4
109. White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
110. 17 U.S.C. §1(e) (1952)..
111. Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents on HR. 10434, 69th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 240 (1926).
112. Henn, "Magazine Rights"-A Division of Indvsible Copyright, 40 CoRmNEL

L.Q. 411-74 (1955).
113. Dubin, AN ExcLusiv

FmmL SysT~m FOR ALL WoRs

(mimeo. 1955).

114. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Co., 298 Fed. 470, 474-75 (E.D.S.C.),
aff'd, 2 F2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924).
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In an action for infringement brought by a licensee of such rights, the
copyright proprietor is an indispensible party,1 5 and, if unwilling to
join as a plaintiff, may be made a party defendant." 6
These by-products of the so-called "indivisible copyright theory"
have proved burdensome." 7 Provisions for divisibility of copyright
have been included in the Thomas bill 8 and other earlier legislative
efforts to revise the copyright law." 9 Whether divisible copyright will
become part of our law may, in large part, hinge on the question of
elimination of formalities from our copyright system. Acceptance
of the doctrine of automatic statutory copyright on creation would remove the need for retaining the theory of indivisible copyrights.2"
Should Federal Law Supersede Common Law Rights in
Unpublished Works?
It has also been suggested that, in revising the copyright law, consideration be given to the proposal that common-law rights in unpublished works should be superseded by federal law.' 2 It is urged,
on behalf of this proposal, that an exclusive federal system covering all
literary and artistic property, whether published or unpublished, will
promote uniformity and certainty in the law by taking the protection of
unpublished works out of the hands of the several states and investing
federal law with sole jurisdiction.2
CONCLUSION

Revisions of our copyright laws have occurred periodically since
the first act of May 31, 1790, each subsequent revision having occurred
within a forty-year period, namely, in 1831, 1870, and 1909.,13 Almost a half century has elapsed since the last revision. In the interim
there has been a complete revolution in the arts of mass communication.
115. Buck v. Elm Lodge, Inc., 83 F2d 201 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Alexander v. Irving
Trust Co., 132 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F.
Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 Fed. 994
(S.D.N.Y. 1915).
116. Hoffman v. Santly-Joy, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 778, 779 (S.D.N.Y.

1943).

117. Solberg, The Present Copyright Situation, 40 YAIn L.J. 184, 190 (1930).
118. S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
119. E.g., H.R. 9137, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. §§45, 46 (1924); H.R. 11258,
68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925); S. 4355, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925).
120. Henn, DlVisiamiuy OF COPYRIGHT 6 (mimeo. 1955).
121. Dubin, op. cit. supra note 113.

122. Id. at 10-11.
123. The revisions after 1790 were: Act of February 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 STAT. 436;
Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 STAT. 198; Copyright Act of 1909, 35 STAT. 1075.
For the many attempts to revise our copyright laws after 1909, see GOLDmAN, HisTORY
oF U.S.A. COPYRIGHT LAw RmVsioN-1901-1954

(1955).
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Yet our copyright laws have remained relatively static with the exception of the recognition of motion pictures in 1912 '2 4 -before the days
of sound films-and the belated grant of recording and performing
rights to poets and other authors of non-dramatic literary works in
1952.25 We have made progress in our international relations by
adherence to the Buenos Aires Convention in 1914 128 and the Universal Copyright Convention in 1954.12 7

In a day when many musical compositions are recorded on phonograph records or on tape before they are published, authors run the
risk of losing all rights.'
There is also danger that, with the adoption of the Universal
Copyright Convention, foreign courts may limit the period of protection which American works enjoy abroad to that which they enjoy at
home. 29 Heretofore, although the United States has accorded copyright protection for a period of twenty-eight years with an additional
twenty-eight year period in the event of proper renewal, practically
every other country where our works have had a substantial market has
accorded protection to those works for a period equal to the life of the
author plus fifty years. We cannot expect such generous treatment in
the future unless we are prepared to grant similar treatment to foreign
nationals in the United States.
Before the Second World War, the Carnegie Foundation made
an exhaustive study of the subject under the leadership of Professor
Shotwell,1 0 but the advent of the war and the necessity of strengthening
our international copyright relations through a Universal Convention
before turning our attention to domestic issues have postponed a critical examination of the existing law. Congress has now made an appropriation for a study by the Copyright Office under the leadership
of Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights. 181 It is understood that
124. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, c. 356, 37 STAT. 488.
125. Act of July 17, 1952, c. 923, 66 STAT. 752, effective January 1, 1953 as 17
U.S.C. § 1(c) (1952).
126. Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, Buenos
Aires, signed August 11, 1910, ratified by the United States March 12, 1911, and
proclaimed July 13, 1914.
127. See note 53 supra.

128. See note 19 supra.
129. The Universal Copyright Convention provides that no contracting state

shall be obliged to grant protection to a work for a period longer than that fixed for
the particular class of works by the country of origin. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, art. IV(4).
130. The Thomas Bill, S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., which was introduced on
January 8, 1940, incorporated the results of Professor Shotwel's study.
131. Act of Aug. 5, 1955, c. 568, 69 STAT. 499. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on HR. 7117, 84th Cong.,

1st Sess. 115-19, 122 (1955) ; Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 7117, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1955).
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the same pattern of consultation with experts in the various fields of
intellectual property which resulted in the formulation and approval by
Congress of the Universal Copyright Convention will be followed by
the Copyright Office in its study of copyright law revision. In this
way all groups may be heard.
In the limited space available, no attempt has been made to cover
all of the issues requiring re-examination. We have presented some
of the highlights id the hope of stimulating discussion.
" Perhaps no one in our time was more devoted to the
cause of
copyright reform in our country that the late Register of Copyrights,
Thorvald Solberg, who summarized the following needed reforms more
than a quarter century ago:
"(1) The abrogation of such 'formalities' as notice of copyright, deposit of copies and registration of claim of copyright;
(2) abolishment of the arbitrary distinction in the treatment of
published and unpublished works; (3) the separation of the various rights included in copyright, so that each can be dealt with
singly; (4) the substitution of a single, continuous term of copyright protection, based on the life of the author, in place of the
present system of first term and a renewal term." 132
These reforms have not yet been achieved. They are long overdue. The intervening years with frequent and often disappointing
litigation have shown the wisdom of these suggested changes.* The
inquiry now in prospect by the Register of Copyrights will receive
the hearty endorsement and cooperation of the entire copyright bar.
132. Solberg, Introduction to DFWorx, AN
xxiii (1925).
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